{"id":9026,"date":"2019-12-28T04:36:54","date_gmt":"2019-12-28T04:36:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/gcas.ie\/?p=9026"},"modified":"2026-11-21T12:38:38","modified_gmt":"2026-11-21T12:38:38","slug":"theorizing-the-ideally-non-ideal-sann-restrepos-decolonizing-democracy-and-political-philosophy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/gcas.ie\/es\/theorizing-the-ideally-non-ideal-sann-restrepos-decolonizing-democracy-and-political-philosophy\/","title":{"rendered":"Theorizing the Ideally Non-Ideal: San\u00edn Restrepo\u2019s Decolonizing Democracy and Political Philosophy"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/images.squarespace-cdn.com\/content\/v1\/5ba68d8ba9ab951e0bf4bea6\/1577510032471-T9AZ2X65OWC0WRM6S2GL\/Theorizing%2Bthe%2BIdeally%2Bnonideal.png?ssl=1\" alt=\"Theorizing the Ideally nonideal.png\"\/><\/p>\n<div class=\"sqs-html-content\" data-sqsp-text-block-content>\n<p style=\"text-align:center;white-space:pre-wrap;\" class=\"\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.gcasreview.com\/s\/Theorizing-the-Ideally-Non-Ideal_-Sanin-Restrepos-Decolonizing-Democracy-and-Political-Philosophy-28-xcp6.pdf\" target=\"_blank\">DOWNLOAD THE PDF<\/a><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align:center;white-space:pre-wrap;\" class=\"\"><strong>Abstract: <\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left:40px;white-space:pre-wrap;\" class=\"\">This paper examines methodological problems in political philosophy by way of an examination of the phenomenon of coloniality, animated by an analysis of Ricardo San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s <em>Decolonizing Democracy: Power in a Solid State<\/em>. I argue that rigorous political philosophy cannot involve narrowing one\u2019s philosophical scope to either \u201cideal theory\u201d or \u201cnonideal theory,\u201d as has become commonplace in contemporary Analytic philosophy. San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s text is taken up as an exemplar of an approach in which the theoretical account of an ideal or ideals is worked out in relation to a critical account of political reality, and, hence, an account that restricts itself neither to ideal nor nonideal theory. Using San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s account of coloniality, I defend the position that both ideal theory and nonideal theory in the Analytic tradition would manifest certain forms of disciplinary decadence due to their inattention to forms of epistemic and axiological colonization formative to Euromodern philosophy. By the same token, though, I argue that this points to tendencies toward decadence in the so-called Continental tradition, and that these tendencies may call into question certain of San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s conclusions about the function of political philosophy for decolonization. I conclude with a discussion of the synthesis of alternative ideals as an imperative for anti-colonial and decolonial approaches in political philosophy, arguing that such an endeavor entails pairing the project of articulating novel values beyond Euromodern ones with the critical project of elucidating coloniality\u2019s implicit rationality. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">        Invoking Hegel\u2019s <em>Philosophy of Right<\/em>, John Rawls wrote that \u201cpolitical philosophy may try to calm our frustration and rage against our society and its history by showing us the way in which its institutions, when properly understood from a philosophical point of view, are rational, and developed over time as they did to attain their present, rational form.\u201d[1] Though on Rawls\u2019s account this is merely one among the several primary roles that political philosophy is called upon to fulfill, it raises an obvious question: what if the philosopher, in the process of elucidating the rationality and development of political institutions, demonstrates that they ought to serve as profound sources of rage and revolt rather than rapprochement?<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Relevant to this question is the contemporary divide among many philosophers\u2014particularly those trained in the so-called Analytic or Anglo-American tradition\u2014that is framed in terms of a binary logic in which one either performs what Rawls had termed \u201cideal theory\u201d or what he had called \u201cnonideal theory.\u201d[2] Ideal theory on this account \u201cworks out the principles that characterize a well-ordered society under favorable circumstances,\u201d whereas nonideal theory \u201cis worked out after an ideal conception of justice has been chosen; only then do the parties ask which principles to adopt under less happy conditions.\u201d[3] Charles Mills has advanced an argument that Rawls\u2019s focus on the importance of ideal theory has played an ideological role in keeping political philosophers from reckoning with the realities of the profoundly unjust societies those philosophers inhabit.[4] A bevy of literature either affirming its status as non-ideal theory or engaged in conceptual examination of the notion of non-ideal theory has emerged in Mills\u2019s wake.[5]<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Though it is perhaps curious that Rawls\u2019s conceptual distinction between theoretical approaches has retained its currency even among many of those professing to be his staunchest contemporary critics, it is noteworthy that non-ideal theory, so defined, would seem to have limited relevance to the Hegelian role for political philosophy that Rawls found so noteworthy. While there is certainly no shortage of literature that finds the contemporary world to be a profoundly unjust one and that endeavors to examine the conditions under which it has come into existence, little of this work is expressly categorized or understood as political philosophy. Indeed, although there is much work in intellectual history that examines the ideas espoused by the architects of unjust social and political institutions, rarely does such work move toward an analysis of the <em>coherent <\/em>underpinnings of such institutions.[6] That is to say, it is one thing to study the ideological positions expressed by the architects of political realities and to examine the contradictions that their rhetoric seeks to elide, but it is quite another to examine the philosophical foundations of institutions whose founders and servants articulate rationalizations that are at odds with institutional realities. Against this tendency, the political philosopher may have reason to treat existing systems <em>as if <\/em>they were well-ordered and to articulate the rationality that makes them function, even if that rationality is repressed or disavowed by those institutions and their representatives. Such an effort, in turn, may suggest not only a more rigorous <em>descriptive <\/em>political philosophy but may yield insights that the political philosopher working narrowly within the framework of <em>normative<\/em> political philosophy may otherwise tend to overlook.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            In this essay, I seek to reflect on the project of political philosophy in light of these challenges through an examination of a recent text that takes a peculiar approach: Ricardo San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s <em>Decolonizing Democracy: Power in a Solid State<\/em>.[7] That work offers a powerful examination of the logic of contemporary political institutions, one that seeks to go to the heart of their implicit rationalities. In this paper, I will explore San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s text in order to show how it demonstrates an alternative to the \u201cideal theory\u201d vs. \u201cnon-ideal theory\u201d divide as well as to work through some of the challenges that such an alternative entails. I will begin by examining San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s account of the relationship between coloniality and democracy, wherein he argues that the production of <em>simulacra<\/em> of democracy is an essential feature of coloniality. I will then offer an account of the relationship between theory and ideals, building upon San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s account of coloniality as it pertains to contemporary enthusiasm for the project of non-ideal theory in Analytic philosophy and political theory. I then turn to some of the shortcomings of prevailing tendencies in Continental thought in addressing these matters through an exploration of San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s argument for the necessity of <em>decryption <\/em>for decolonization. Finally, I conclude by examining how recent work on the possibility and\/or realization of \u201cother modernities\u201d points to alternative directions forward in which political philosophy can take up the task of rigorously examining the non-ideal without abandoning the analytic project of articulating desirable political ideals. In short, I argue in this paper that political philosophy can facilitate decolonization by uniting the project of offering a rational analysis of coloniality\u2014a theory of conditions that are \u201cnon-ideal\u201d but are nonetheless governed by the <em>logic<\/em> of a colonial political ideal\u2014with the project of articulating alternative ideals.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\"><\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\"><em>\u201cDemocracy\u201d and Coloniality<\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The telos of a variety of modern institutions, if we take them at their word, is the achievement of democracy, at least in some shape or form. But the telos of those same institutions, if we are to take the word of a preponderance of voices on modernity\u2019s underside (to employ Enrique Dussel\u2019s now familiar turn of phrase), is domination\u2014or, more specifically, coloniality, a global system of domination coextensive with what can be termed Euromodernity.[8] If democracy is defined coherently, then coloniality would seem to be its antithesis: the systematic subordination of the masses of people. Yet modern discourse and institutions seem to function so that what they term \u201cdemocracy\u201d is understood in such a way that it is not only compatible with coloniality but is, further, its necessary complement. Coloniality is plainly an enemy to democracy as such, but, in spite of this, coloniality functions as an uncurious bedfellow to the \u201cdemocracy\u201d that Euromodern regimes purport to manifest. This implies that the mode of \u201cdemocracy\u201d that coloniality inaugurates and sustains is not democracy at all. If this is the case, though, what is to be made of the fact that it continues to be called \u201cdemocracy\u201d?<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; This evident paradox is at the heart of <em>Decolonizing Democracy<\/em>. San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s book can be seen as playing a dual role. As a work in critical theory, it articulates how \u201cdemocracy\u201d functions as a concept undergirding domination of a variety of stripes. For San\u00edn-Restrepo, it is not merely that modern institutions belie their aims by paying mere lip service to democracy, but rather that a counterfeit notion of democracy renders coloniality more total, more successful, and more durable. \u201c[T]he uniqueness of coloniality,\u201d he writes, \u201cis that in order for potestas [the capture of the power of language and the imposition of qualifications for its use] to act expansively and frictionlessly it must <em>simulate <\/em>democracy and thus necessarily <em>encrypt <\/em>power\u201d (1). San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s text, though, goes beyond mere critical theory toward the terrain of political philosophy insofar as it puts forward a provocative argument about the actual meaning of democracy. As such, this text elaborates a grand theory of a political ideal coupled with an analysis of how, in the service of a \u201csimulacrum\u201d of that ideal, coloniality is able to subvert democracy in service of \u201cdemocracy.\u201d[9]<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; To briefly summarize the book\u2019s core contentions, coloniality creates what San\u00edn-Restrepo terms \u201cthe hidden people\u201d (34-7). On the one hand, the hidden people are a constitutive exclusion of modernity. The disavowal of their humanity (174) facilitates not only their economic exploitation but also a symbolic exploitation: they are the monstrous presence, the \u201cdifference\u201d against which modern democracy is supposed to protect (43-4). They are made to represent that which, by virtue of being extra-human, is thereby subhuman; as a \u201cproblem people\u201d (33), they become <em>the <\/em>problem that rule \u201cof and by\u201d the people must combat.[10] Under conditions of coloniality, democracy as such is subverted by the process wherein \u201cdemocracy,\u201d as a simulacrum of actual democracy, is legitimated precisely through its opposition to the hidden people. The <em>demos <\/em>recognized by Euromodern polities refers not to the people as such but rather to a conception of \u201cthe people\u201d that emerges once the humanity of the hidden people is radically discounted.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            In fact, the reality of the hidden people\u2019s exclusion reveals \u201cdemocracy\u201d not to be democracy: if there are people who are not served\u2014indeed, people who are exploited, oppressed, and routinely massacred\u2014then one is dealing not with rule by the people and for the people but with rule by <em>some <\/em>people and for <em>some<\/em> rather than all. The philosophical resolution of such a problem is to hold, in short, that the <em>some <\/em>represent the true<em> <\/em>referent of \u201cpeople,\u201d and the problematic hidden people are, on such an account, regarded as blameworthy for not having fit themselves into the narrow parameters of the model citizens who constitute the true <em>demos<\/em>. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            The outcome of this inversion is a notion of democracy premised on similarity to (or, simply, <em>sameness <\/em>vis-\u00e0-vis) the people who constitute modernity\u2019s overside, which entails that \u201cdemocracy\u201d must function as a project for the eradication of difference. For San\u00edn-Restrepo, though, democracy <em>is<\/em> difference. The nature of the people lies in their irreducibility to rigid logical formulae and in their capacity to always be otherwise than any definition would dictate. Hence, the effort to articulate the <em>demos <\/em>as denotated in advance by a well-ordered logical statement about what it is to be human is, simply, dehumanizing. San\u00edn-Restrepo writes that \u201cdifference is not what a being is\u2014that is, it is not the recognizable stamp or emblem that being exhibits to the light in order to be commensurable, but rather, difference is what being produces through its difference\u201d (64). What makes democracy desirable is precisely the capacity of human existents to lie beyond epistemic formulae that could apprehend and ideally serve their interests.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            If democracy, as such, is for San\u00edn-Restrepo the actualization of difference (64-70), then the \u201cdemocracy\u201d espoused by Euromodern regimes is a project founded on the production of sameness as a democratic inversion. Coloniality, then, works through a simulacrum of democracy: Euromodernity yields \u201cdemocracy\u201d which is, simply put, the antithesis of democracy. It is an imitation of an ideal whose function is to preempt and eradicate the ideal itself. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            This suggests that the fulfillment of democracy would require not merely a celebration of difference, but a process of decrypting the codes that serve the simulacrum in order to set afoot projects through which decolonization could be pursued in earnest. Decolonization, on this account, requires more than simply the eradication of colonial institutions and power structures. That is because the functioning of such structures is a veiled one: coloniality presents the colonial as if it were the \u201cdemocratic.\u201d It presents the domination of the hidden people as if it were simply the will of the people. What is colonial is, for Euromodern coloniality, presented as if it were non-colonial, just as contemporary forms of racism\u2014as one of coloniality\u2019s fundamental components\u2014are typically expressed as deriving from a commitment to being non-racist.[11] For San\u00edn-Restrepo, this means that central to coloniality is the encryption of power (7-13). Encryption, he writes,   <\/p>\n<p style=\"margin-left:40px;white-space:pre-wrap;\" class=\"\">not only serves the purpose of upending democracy, but also severs politics, as it privatizes it to the sole dominium of experts. What is encrypted is not only the formal sense of the words and constructions of the law, but every chain of communication, every code and point of access to interpretation, through which we identify reality. \u2026Encryption is thus the main circuit by which power as domination operates under the code names of \u2018democracy\u2019, \u2018rule of law\u2019, and the \u2018open market\u2019. (10)<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\"><\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As such, to decolonize and bring forth actual democracy would require projects of decryption in which the true functioning of power is unmasked. This project of decryption is central to San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s oeuvre. It was originally elaborated by him and Gabriel M\u00e9ndez-Hincapie in their 2012 article, \u201cLa Constituci\u00f3n Encriptada\u201d (\u201cThe Encrypted Constitution\u201d), and it is the subject of his recent edited volume, <em>Decrypting Power<\/em>.[12] On his account, \u201cdecryption means not only a critical or semiotic tool but fundamentally the primordial act of liberation and the first exercise of power. \u2026Decryption is not the world unveiled but the world reimagined, written with a new light and new intensity.\u201d[13] Decryption, then, figures for San\u00edn-Restrepo as indispensable to the project of decolonization. The encryption of power is part and parcel of coloniality. Deciphering how coloniality functions demands decryptive efforts. And, indeed, to <em>realize <\/em>democracy would require putting in place systems of power that are not encrypted. Hence, decryption is a vital force of democratic practice, and not merely a demystifying prerequisite to radical anti-colonial upheaval.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\"><em>Theories and Ideals<\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; This perspective on democracy suggests that one group for whom San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s volume should be of pressing interest would be one that may at first strike many readers as unlikely: namely, contemporary political philosophers and theorists working through or alongside the Analytic philosophical tradition.[14] As discussed above, such philosophical communities, in particular due to the interventions of Mills, have begun to focus attention on the project of \u201cnon-ideal theory.\u201d This tendency is anchored in response to the overwhelming, half-century long popularity of Rawls in that tradition and the many debates on the meaning of justice that emerged in Rawls\u2019s wake. Why, asked critics like Mills, was the dominant tendency of philosophers in manifestly unjust societies to inquire <em>only <\/em>into the meaning of justice within an ideal (or idealized) society, when such work appeared to prevent a philosophical reckoning with political and social realities?[15] <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A tension within recent calls for non-ideal theory, however, pertains to whether such calls are adequate to dealing with the coloniality of ideal theory and the broader colonization of political thought of which it is both part and symptom. It is perhaps trivial to note that philosophical work could only be identified as \u201cnon-ideal theory\u201d if one has at least an elementary sense of the ideal itself; a rudimentary conception of what is ideal would seem to be a minimal prerequisite for maintaining that one\u2019s work pertains to the non-ideal. Indeed, on Rawls\u2019s definition, nonideal theory presupposes mutual respect for resolved principles of ideal theory. But suppose the call for non-ideal theory ought to be regarded in the way that many (though by no means all) do: as a call to <em>abandon <\/em>ideal theory in favor of non-ideal theory. Ideal theory would then be either a province of the colonial past untouched by ongoing efforts of epistemic decolonization, or it would be the province of present and future thinkers who (as Mills\u2019s argument suggests) maintain an ideological commitment to ignoring reality. A consequence of the call to abandon ideal theory, then, may be to facilitate the covert recolonization of how human beings conceive of ideals. The recolonization of how ideals are conceived, in turn, would have metatheoretical consequences for how the domain of non-ideal theory is conceived.[16]<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As such, I read <em>Decolonizing Democracy<\/em> as a contribution to an alternative approach. Rather than simply offering a theory of the ideal or retreating to a philosophical treatment of injustices as such, San\u00edn-Restrepo offers a theory of the ideal that demonstrates how the colonization of the meaning of that ideal generates non-ideal realities. In other words, here we have an effort to decolonize the ideal of democracy, coupled with a theory of how coloniality can undermine the ideal of democracy by producing \u201cdemocracy.\u201d <em>Decolonizing Democracy<\/em>, therefore, offers a theory of democracy as an ideal at the same time that it can be conceived of as \u201cnon-ideal theory\u201d insofar as it examines a) how extant realities do not manifest the ideal articulated and b) questions of what ought to be done in light of such non-ideality. In that sense, the work can be seen as fulfilling the demands of both sides of the ideal\/non-ideal debate. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            However, there are elements of San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s text that suggest there is a greater depth of approach than simply engaging in both ideal and non-ideal theory. A consequence of his contentions would be that \u201cdemocracy\u201d (the simulacrum) itself functions as an ideal. Euromodern institutions appeal repeatedly to \u201cdemocracy\u201d as an ideal. If San\u00edn-Restrepo is correct, it is not so much that they do so because of an error in reasoning on account of which they have failed to discern the crucial differences between democracy and \u201cdemocracy.\u201d This is because \u201cdemocracy\u201d is precisely the ideal that coloniality calls for. In short, <em>the ideal of coloniality<\/em> is to develop a simulacrum of democracy that would universally be regarded as democracy itself \u2013 even by the underside that finds itself crushed and massacred in the process. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            We might here distinguish between monistic and pluralistic senses of the notion of an ideal. A monistic sense of ideality would entail that the nature of ideals is such that they are always subordinate to <em>the <\/em>ideal, the unitary end which all lesser ideals serve regionally. Ideal-monism, then, holds that all subordinate ideals are dissolved into a single ideal whose teleological gravity pulls in all others. The only functional ideal on such an account is, therefore, the <em>ideal<\/em> ideal. For instance, an ideal-monist proponent of capitalism would maintain that proponents of socialism are <em>mistaken<\/em> about what is ideal; socialists, on such an account, would be charged with <em>having made an error in reasoning<\/em> that has led them to regard capitalism as diverging from <em>the <\/em>ideal. The same would hold in reverse for an ideal-monist proponent of socialism: the capitalist, from that vantage, has failed to offer or abide by a rigorous account of what is truly idea. By contrast, ideal-pluralism would hold that one can and should speak of multiple, differentiable ideals, without the presupposition that one among these ideals constitutes the ultimate ideal to which other ideals must be subordinated. On that model, one can rigorously articulate a multiplicity of ideals that, given ideal articulations thereof, could stand in relation to one another without dissolution into the absoluteness of a supraordinate ideal. An ideal-pluralist account could, then, speak of what ideal capitalism demands while also speaking of what ideal socialism demands. Indeed, a socialist political philosopher could distinguish between forms of capitalism that realize capitalist ideals and forms that do not, all while maintaining commitments to socialist ideals\u2014and vice versa for a capitalist political philosopher.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            The call for \u201cnon-ideal theory\u201d often involves a monistic sense of \u201c<em>the <\/em>ideal,\u201d such that non-ideal theory is called for to analyze any deviation from that true ideal. Indeed, such an approach would seem to be an analytic consequence of the Rawlsian definition of nonideal theory, because there the fundamental principles of justice\u2014the theoretical conclusions of ideal theory\u2014have become matters of mutual consent. A pluralistic conception of ideals, by contrast, could be taken to suggest that, say, monarchism, totalitarianism, neoliberalism, and coloniality would each be perspectives from which one could articulate an ideal\u2014indeed, \u201c<em>the<\/em> ideal,\u201d from the vantage point of each of those perspectives\u2014even if that ideal were clearly undesirable from the perspectives of those thereby rendered marginal and\/or disposable. In that sense, San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s text suggests that <em>ideal coloniality<\/em> involves an opposition to democracy that is carried out by fealty to its stated ideal of \u201cdemocracy,\u201d the simulacrum. (Or, alternately, that coloniality is the hidden ideal of \u201cdemocracy.\u201d) Ideal coloniality is thus <em>ideally non-ideal<\/em> from the perspective of the ideal of democracy (rather than from the perspective of simulacra thereof). From the vantage of democracy as an ideal, coloniality is non-ideal, and it is ideally non-ideal where its commitment to \u201cdemocracy,\u201d the simulacrum, prevents agents from understanding their reality as a colonial one. Likewise, from the vantage of coloniality as an ideal, democracy is non-ideal, but \u201cdemocracy\u201d is essential to coloniality\u2019s ideal fulfillment. &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            This suggests that one way to view a possible function of political philosophy is that it may proceed through an examination of how a society and its institutions would function when serving particular articulable ideals, independent of a subscription to the normative desirability of those ideals. A philosophical account of coloniality as an ideal would, on those terms, have to take seriously many of the problems that coloniality as a coherent system of values presents. That is to say, taken as a term in decolonial studies or critical theory, \u201ccoloniality\u201d is often used to refer to a <em>period <\/em>rather than to a supraordinate ideal. Although any understanding of coloniality would be wise to be attentive to the ways in which study of its development requires an examination of coloniality as a <em>longue dur\u00e9e <\/em>historical phenomenon, there are significant intellectual disadvantages to treating coloniality as <em>merely<\/em> a periodized historical happening.[17] Consider, for instance, what occurs where opposition to colonial institutions yields dialectical outcomes involving overthrow of some but not all dimensions of the coloniality of those institutions\u2014that is, what could be described as cases of <em>partial decolonization<\/em>. Though one may certainly speak of coloniality <em>remaining<\/em> in these instances, should one really treat the entire ensemble of events as manifesting coloniality no more and no less than the preceding conditions? That is, what is the relationship between coloniality and states of institutional affairs that are partly but not wholly neo-colonial? To coherently <em>distinguish<\/em> dimensions of coloniality from dimensions of decoloniality, then, may demand that the theorist go beyond referring simply to historical phenomena\u2014since even decoloniality could then be understood reductively as mere historical <em>consequence<\/em> of coloniality\u2014toward an articulation of the axiological differences that distinguish coloniality from opposition thereto.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            This suggests, indeed, that <em>coloniality<\/em> can be understood as an ideal distinct from <em>colonialism<\/em> as an ideal. Many discussions of coloniality, particularly in wake of that term\u2019s growing popularity, involve a na\u00efve conflation of colonialism with coloniality even where those discussions retain an acknowledgement of the basic point that coloniality may remain where proper colonialism has subsided. Properly speaking, though, it may be said that colonialism as an ideal is anti-coloniality and vice versa. For those who truly regard colonialism as ideal, the non-sovereignty of the colonized or the \u201chidden people\u201d is ideal; their absolute fealty is ideal, rather than the efforts through which their functional fealty is retained through compromising on the status of its absoluteness. For colonialism on those terms, there is no need to articulate \u201cdemocracy\u201d as a simulacrum of democracy for the hidden people. The hidden people are simply regarded as those who are legitimately subordinated and, indeed, legitimately killable wherever they manifest resistance to their colonization. Coloniality as an ideal, though, is compatible with the partial sovereignty and\/or pseudo-sovereignty<em> <\/em>of the hidden people. If one is willing to understand coloniality in terms of <em>a distinction in political philosophy<\/em>\u2014as opposed to a historical or sociological conception of coloniality merely as residue of previous phenomena of colonization\u2014then it functions under the terms of a different configuration of values than colonialism, even if coloniality\u2019s values predominantly derive from colonialism. For coloniality so defined, neo-colonialism is ultimately more desirable than colonialism; hence, colonialism is not coloniality\u2019s ideal. The need to give neo-colonialism a veneer of being \u201cnon-colonial\u201d calls, in turn\u2014as San\u00edn-Restrepo contends\u2014for a simulacrum of democracy.[18]<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            In light of this, it is worth reflecting on the ways in which non-ideal theory may have need to distinguish between colonialism and coloniality. Non-ideal theory offers descriptive and\/or normative philosophical accounts of political agency under conditions of unfulfilled ideals. If one accepts Rawlsian principles of justice, then any analysis of conditions of colonialism or of coloniality ought to qualify as non-ideal theory because both constitute unjust conditions.[19] But it certainly should not be taken-for-granted that disobedience and resistance to an unjust sociopolitical order ought to be inattentive to the particular ways in which that order functions. Hence, what resistance to coloniality demands may be substantively different than what resistance to colonialism demands. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            For instance, if we take proponents of non-ideal theory at their word about what they value, then Frantz Fanon\u2019s breathtaking <em>The Wretched of the Earth<\/em> ought to be seen as a <em>locus classicus<\/em> for that field.[20] That text gives a thorough philosophical account of decolonization under conditions of colonialism. Yet the text is also concerned with articulating the neo-colonial future that is likely to succeed such decolonization and is engaged in exploring how decolonization ought to proceed in order to forestall such neo-colonial outcomes. Hence, one may analyze Fanon\u2019s text as offering an account of decolonization under conditions of colonialism while taking seriously the possibility of coloniality replacing colonialism. This implies, though, that it is a slightly different matter to explore what decolonization looks like <em>under conditions of coloniality rather than colonialism<\/em>\u2014a matter that, in light of Fanon\u2019s concerns, one may reasonably conclude he would have taken seriously as a concern not fully addressed in <em>Wretched<\/em>. Decolonization under conditions of colonialism may involve very different demands than decolonization under conditions of coloniality, as the contemporary preference of some to speak of \u201cdecoloniality\u201d implies.[21] Understanding what decolonization in variegated contexts demands makes the philosophical project of understanding the difference between colonialism\u2019s ideal and coloniality\u2019s ideal an urgent task. To briefly sketch the philosophical matters demanding attention here, note that whereas colonialism as such may be static and grounded in principles of rule, coloniality is dynamic and relies on efforts at what Reva Siegel has termed \u201cpreservation-through-transformation\u201d in order to foment elements of consent.[22] Coloniality employs Rousseauian dimensions of legitimation where colonialism sticks to Hobbesian ones, even though neither actually satisfies the conditions for legitimacy articulated by Hobbes or Rousseau.[23] To pose questions of anti-colonial political agency rigorously suggests a call for understanding these diverging ideals, because to misunderstand what coloniality values is to put oneself in a position of very easily contributing to its replication. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            Simply put, the non-ideal theorist who understands \u201cdemocracy,\u201d the simulacrum, as part of the ideal form of coloniality will have a greater grasp of the philosophical demands on genuine decolonization. A pluralistic conception of the task of ideal theory, then, would facilitate a more rigorous approach to non-ideal theory.<em> <\/em>In light of that, <em>Decolonizing Democracy <\/em>can be taken as representative of an alternative approach that, rather than rejecting ideal theory, philosophically interrogates ideals in order to understand how contemporary manifestations of power undermine the fulfillment of those ideals. Further, the text also serves as an argument that, under present conditions and within Euromodernity more generally, the conceptual decolonization of the notion of the ideal is therefore a prerequisite to eventual fulfillment of the ideal itself. That is to say that, because the ideal of democracy is present within now-existing vocabularies in such a way that it is confused for the colonial simulacrum \u201cdemocracy,\u201d to decrypt this manifestation of colonial power would demand not only an analysis of how status quo institutions are not actually democratic but also the effort of demonstrating what, in reality, democracy as an ideal must be understood to mean. Hence, the text speaks to the ways in which an abandonment of ideal theory in order to grapple with extant sociopolitical realities may be counter-productive.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\"><em>Decrypting Philosophy?<\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; I have thus far situated San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s text in relation to the debate concerning ideal and non-ideal theory that bears currency in the Analytic tradition. A more obvious audience for the book, however, in light of the array of interlocutors that animate the bulk of its theoretical explorations, would be those working through critical theory and political philosophy by way of the so-called Continental tradition. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            After a brief discussion of coloniality by way of figures such as Walter Mignolo, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Ram\u00f3n Grosfoguel, and Lewis Gordon at the outset of Chapter 1, the rest of the text primarily pursues its lines of argumentation by way of interventions aimed at figures whose work enjoys considerable currency in contemporary Continental thought. To wit, the centrality of the \u201csimulacrum\u201d to San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s argument suggests an implicit indebtedness to Jean Baudrillard; Chapter 1 closes with a discussion of power heavily inflected with the work of Michel Foucault; Chapter 2 probes ideas from a who\u2019s who of Continental thinkers (Jean-Luc Nancy, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, and Slavoj \u017di\u017eek figure prominently, alongside many others) to give an initial account of the notions of politics, the people, and democracy, though the engagements with Gordon\u2019s ideas constitute perhaps the primary fulcrum; Chapter 3, \u201cDifference and Simulacra,\u201d centers on a critical engagement with Gilles Deleuze; the centerpiece of Chapter 4 is an exhaustive and rather creative exploration of Aristotelian metaphysics that is ultimately targeted at Giorgio Agamben; and Chapter 5, which comprises nearly half of the entire book, is aptly summarized by its subtitle: \u201cAgainst Negri\u2019s Understanding of Spinoza.\u201d Neither the arguments within these subsections nor the overall thesis that they ultimately serve are derivative of these interlocutors. Rather, the method employed generally is well described by San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s specific claim that the third chapter \u201cuse[s] Deleuze as a kind of Archimedean lever\u201d (47). In short, the text represents an aim to decolonize our understanding of democracy, and the centrality of European critical thought in the text is, I take it, functional rather than essential: these are tools that facilitate the communication of the text\u2019s central ideas. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            Given that, it may have been a nice addendum for San\u00edn-Restrepo to have dealt with the methodological and metatheoretical issues that the central role of European Continental thought in the text seems to raise. I take this to be the case especially in light of the weight of the volume\u2019s title. If we speak of democracy as a concept, then the book can be regarded as primarily a conceptual decolonization. That is to say, it demonstrates philosophically that there have been errors in the articulation of the concept, that these errors have occurred because of a colonial project, and that those errors in turn contribute to the establishment and endurance of \u201cpower in a solid state\u201d (13), a simulacrum of democracy that militates against the arrival of democracy itself. The text demonstrates that Agamben, Delueze, Derrida, and others are radical critics of the simulacrum whose insights facilitate its decryption. At the same time, though, the text\u2014by virtue of San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s extended criticisms of these figures animated by his attention to the phenomenon of the hidden people and thinking in decolonial studies\u2014would seem to suggest that the work of Continental thought is in some sense <em>a part<\/em> <em>of the simulacrum<\/em>. That is to say, on San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s account, these figures are effective critics in key areas but are, on the whole, insufficiently radical. Their commitment to democracy may be both insightful and genuine\u2014and even may offer meaningful contributions to the larger project of decolonizing democracy\u2014but is also bedeviled by elements of the coloniality of reason. Hence, we face the question of whether Continental thought is constitutive of the simulacrum. If so, then San\u00edn-Restrepo can be said to be engaged in a decryption of Continental thought. The reader is left to wonder, then, whether the aspects of coloniality that tinge Continental thought are merely errors that can be overcome through more rigorous reasoning within that tradition or whether they are symptomatic of more general patterns in Euromodernity that call for interventions of a different sort. I suspect that the basic answer is somewhere in between: that these are <em>characteristic <\/em>errors, but that Euromodern thought may nonetheless be capable of changing its character. But even so, this leaves open as a theoretical concern the question of whether the changing of that character would require certain transcendental moves or could be accomplished in a fashion that is immanent to it. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            Now, here one may point to San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s affirmation of the Deleuzian criticism of the transcendent\/immanent dualism (48-9) as a response: it would seem, in short, that <em>difference <\/em>is the antidote\u2014that the anti-democratic dimensions of Euro-modern thought can be overcome by democratizing theory. But if this is the case, it still raises the metatheoretical issue of whether the Deleuzian or even San\u00edn-Restrepian articulation of difference achieves its apparent viability because of a hidden recapitulation of the logic of coloniality. I raise these issues not in order to argue that <em>Decolonizing Democracy<\/em> falls into the very traps that it warns of\u2014that it is, ultimately, a simulacrum of what a<em> real <\/em>conceptual decolonization of democracy would amount to\u2014but to suggest that this is a theoretical concern that the text\u2019s thesis raises as a possibility but that the text does not ultimately pursue. The text appears implicitly confident in its position on both the role that Continental thought plays in sustaining the simulacrum and the role that it can play in abolishing it. The theoretical position on democracy argued for, though, raises the stakes for making explicit the role that Continental thought can and should play for anybody interested in the project of decolonizing democracy.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            On the one hand, then, San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s project can be read as seeking to render more rigorous the decyptive endeavors that have been undertaken implicitly or explicitly in Continental critical theory. On the other hand, San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s intervention can be read as affecting, at least in part, a decryption <em>of<\/em> Continental thought, such that it is an endeavor in decrypting power <em>by way of decrypting theoretical articulations shaped by such power<\/em>. A problem for evaluating such decryption is as follows: one can read San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s intervention as immanent to the Continental tradition that it takes on. One can, for instance, invoke the Foucauldian tradition of examining power relations, the Derridean tradition of deconstruction, and the heremeneutic tradition beginning with Heideggerian phenomenology as exemplars of an approach in which one is engaged in the project of undercutting power by way of a self-reflexive interpretation of its functioning.[24] Indeed, one might contend that, contra the Hegelian project of discerning and celebrating the underlying rationality of institutions, whatever could be called \u201cContinental philosophy\u201d has, since Karl Marx, been concerned with a project of countering those elite mystifications that saturate everyday knowledge production in the West. The project of \u201cdecrypting power\u201d would, on that account, amount to nothing but the continuation under a new name of the project that has been definitive of Continental thought from its origins.[25]<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            For many who begin with the framework of decolonial studies, this could be read as a critical flaw in San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s approach, and, by extension, in any approach to decolonial philosophy premised on intensifying the rigor of Continental thought as opposed to simply demonstrating its enmeshment in coloniality and seeking alternative lines of thought external to it. From that perspective, part of how power in a solid state is achieved is through the production and proliferation of theoretical and philosophical discourses through which the functioning of coloniality is occluded and mystified as the workings of \u201cdemocracy.\u201d Philosophical discourse, then, would be a vital dimension of the encryption of power. This suggests that, in parallel to the problem of \u201cdemocracy\u201d as simulacrum of democracy, we have the problem of \u201cphilosophy\u201d as simulacrum of philosophy. As those like Sylvia Wynter have argued, Euromodernity rests upon an over-representation of the figure of \u201cMan\u201d as if it stood for all of humanity, even as it is only \u201cMan,\u201d narrowly defined as male, white, bourgeois, able-bodied, non-queer, etc. who gets to count as truly human.[26] Within that framework, \u201cphilosophy\u201d could be said to emerge as a simulacrum of philosophy, wherein it is only \u201cMan\u201d\u2014a simulacrum over-representing himself as if he spanned the full breadth and depth of legitimate humanity\u2014that counts as a \u201cphilosopher.\u201d[27]<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            At issue, then, is the question of the relationship between philosophy\u2014beyond \u201cphilosophy,\u201d the simulacrum thereof that functions as an extension of coloniality\u2014and the decryption of power. That is to say, does San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s analysis logically entail that the primary task of the genuine philosopher is to engage in practices of decrypting power, which would include the project of decrypting \u201cphilosophy\u201d? San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s formulation of \u201cpower in a solid state\u201d would certainly seem to suggest such a direction. Democracy on that account functions through what difference produces, but power enters into a solid state through the eradication of the productive power of difference, such that an ideological apparatus is called upon to encrypt \u201cdemocracy\u201d so that it can be mistaken for democracy. To the extent that \u201cphilosophy\u201d is constitutive of such an ideological apparatus, it would appear that the task of the philosopher, if she or he is committed to actualizing democracy, is to demonstrate the functioning of the ideological apparatus through \u201cphilosophers\u201d so that truths can be snatched from the claws of power in a solid state.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            If we accept such decryption as the central task of philosophical decolonization, we may note an important schism between the mainstreams of Analytic and Continental philosophy. The approach to non-ideal theory predominant in contemporary Analytic philosophy, though in many respects emanating from Mills\u2019s attack on the ideological function of the hegemony of ideal theory, is typically not especially concerned with a philosophical critique of extant<em> <\/em>ideology. Typical approaches there might be categorized in terms of (a) expository efforts in applied ideal theory, (b) efforts in what could be termed <em>sub-ideal theory<\/em>, or (c) moral philosophy offering normative prescriptions for agents operating under conditions of political injustice. Efforts toward (a) are grounded in the notion that one should analyze contemporary realities, but they remain grounded in application of existing conceptions in ideal theory rather than in an effort to reconceptualize those ideals\u2014for instance, philosophical accounts of whether or not affirmative action policies are compatible with Rawlsian principles of justice. They thus respond to Mills\u2019s ideological critique of ideal theory but rarely extend to examinations of how ideology shapes the societies under examination or the theorist\u2019s account of those societies. Efforts toward (b) are about conceiving of alternative ideals under the presumption that recourse to <em>ideal<\/em> ideals is supposedly impossible under contemporary conditions. This approach is perhaps best exemplified by Mills\u2019s calls for a theory of \u201cracial justice,\u201d which calls on the philosopher to put considerations about what would constitute justice <em>per se <\/em>to the side in order to articulate what justice demands in cases of repairing particular injustices.[28] Such calls, though, prompt questions about why one should presume the impossibility of justice proper while affirming the possibility of racial justice or other modes of reparative justice; scarcely do such accounts come with reflections on the ideological function that this sort of presumption may serve. Efforts toward (c) most properly fit the Rawlsian articulation of nonideal theory, but such efforts neither are concerned, in typical cases, with an examination of ideology nor should they unproblematically count as efforts in political philosophy, given their grounding in normative principles for individual action rather than principles of political legitimacy.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            By contrast, as noted above, few approaches could be said to be more central to the Continental tradition, as it is conventionally understood, than an examination of ideology and the conditions under which the theorist may be shaped by it. If the approach of decrypting power is understood broadly, it would be rather easy to make the case that much of the Continental canon is engaged in it. Given the suggestion that decryption would be central to the project of decolonization, one could reach the conclusion that the Analytic tradition is ill-equipped for that project but that the Continental tradition is very well-equipped. From there, one could arrive at a further conclusion: that the Analytic tradition is rife with \u201cphilosophy\u201d but that it is within the Continental tradition that one could genuinely find philosophy and, hence, the path toward democracy and beyond coloniality.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            I find such a conclusion highly dubious and troublesome. To begin with, it is clearly the case that the Continental tradition is shot through with the tendency toward \u201cphilosophy\u201d defined here as a simulacrum of philosophy. Eurocentrism is not alien to that tradition, and, indeed, for some critics, it is that tradition\u2019s defining feature.[29] At best, one can conclude that the Continental tradition is one in which the challenge of moving from \u201cphilosophy\u201d to philosophy is a motivating charge. It does not logically follow, though, that the best resources for fulfilling that aim are to be found within that tradition. Here <em>Decolonizing Democracy <\/em>can be taken as evidence: the move to develop a more rigorous and liberatory mode of theories derived from Continental thought requires San\u00edn-Restrepo to draw on insights exogenous to that tradition in order to \u201cturn the screw\u201d on them.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            On this point, one could argue against this characterization by drawing upon San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s Deleuzian rejection of transcendence in favor of an ontology of immanence and difference. Such an argument would suggest that San\u00edn-Restrepo could not have drawn upon a tradition of thought transcending the Continental because of the illusory nature of any such transcendence. One wonders, though, why the rejection of transcendence there ought not be considered merely a matter of <em>regional <\/em>ontology. That is to say, a rejection of <em>any <\/em>metaphysical conception of transcendence strains plausibility; can one regard the arguments of <em>Decolonizing Democracy<\/em> as coherent or persuasive if one rejects <em>any <\/em>possibility of transcendence? What is decolonization if it is not an effort to transcend colonialism and coloniality? One might rightly conclude that the Deleuzian ontology simply involves an oxymoronic quest to move beyond transcendence, and that this quest is less than philosophically rigorous insofar as it conflates particular appearances of the notion of \u201ctranscendence\u201d within the European thought with transcendence itself\u2014the target of the criticism, in short, may be a simulacrum of transcendence. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            Such a conclusion would neither invalidate Deleuze\u2019s formulation of difference nor San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s reworking thereof. What it would demonstrate, though, is that the project of realizing democracy beyond \u201cdemocracy\u201d may call for an appeal to sources beyond the traditions of \u201cphilosophy\u201d whose emergence was coextensive with coloniality. In fine, it is to raise the possibility that political philosophy might transcend political \u201cphilosophy\u201d through an engagement with traditions of thought that \u201cphilosophy\u201d has regarded as <em>a priori <\/em>non-philosophical. Such traditions may have alternative conceptions that philosophers trained in traditions deriving from the hegemony of European thought could engage with in order to transcend the limitations of their concepts of freedom, legitimacy, justice, democracy, and, indeed, transcendence.[30]<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            What that suggests is that the philosophical projects relevant to decolonization are not limited to the project of decrypting power. San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s text moves beyond the limitations of Analytic non-ideal theory insofar as it is concerned with a contestation over the real meaning of democracy as an ideal, and it moves beyond the limitations of Continental thought insofar as it begins by taking seriously the ideas of the hidden people on Euromodernity\u2019s underside. But the contestation over ideals need not only take the form of a decryptive account of what democracy really is once we have partially displaced the Eurocentricity of Continental thought. This implies not only that the project of decrypting power is necessary but insufficient for the achievement of decolonization, but that that project is necessary but insufficient for the decolonization of political philosophy. There is more to be done than to re-read \u201cphilosophy\u201d in light of a demonstration of how it has been shaped by coloniality. While decrypting the \u201cphilosophy\u201d that coloniality has begotten\u2014to demonstrate the ways that such \u201cphilosophy\u201d functions as a manifestation of colonial power\u2014is both an urgent and a worthwhile task, other important tasks remain.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\"><em>From Disavowal to Avowal<\/em> <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            An interesting point of comparison for San\u00edn-Restrepo can be found in the work of Olu\u0301fe\u0301\u0323mi Ta\u0301i\u0301wo\u0300.[31] For Ta\u0301i\u0301wo\u0300, modernity refers to an ideal. Hence, he regards it as incoherent to speak of modernity and coloniality as \u201ctwo sides of the same coin\u201d as does Walter Mignolo or to speak of \u201cEuromodernity\u201d as does Lewis Gordon.[32] That many European thinkers and institutions have failed to realize that ideal\u2014due in large part to their racist, sexist, and colonial commitments\u2014does not, though, imply that the ideal itself ought to be abandoned. Indeed, Ta\u0301i\u0301wo\u0300 argues, there were other figures who were pointing out the failures of Europe and its thinkers to live up to those ideals that they had articulated, and though <em>some <\/em>such critics have been anti-modern, many others have simply been \u201cexcluded moderns,\u201d supporters of modernity who have shown that colonialism and coloniality are projects that undermine modernity.[33] In other words, opposition to coloniality need not imply rejection of modernity. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            The theorists drawn upon by San\u00edn-Restrepo are, for the most part, in the camp more inclined toward rejection or at least problematization of modernity than those who would seek to philosophically evaluate modernity as an ideal realizable in other ways or under different conditions than Euromodernity has sought to do. Ta\u0301i\u0301wo\u0300\u2019s position, however, suggests that decolonization need not be anti-modern or postmodern\u2014indeed, decolonization may itself be profoundly modern. A fusion of the positions of San\u00edn-Restrepo and Ta\u0301i\u0301wo\u0300 implies that the simulacrum, \u201cdemocracy,\u201d seeks to exclude, in short, the decolonial moderns. One could then maintain that many of the excluded decolonial moderns are, as well, disavowed democrats. Their decolonial commitments led them to a rigorous articulation of democracy as an ideal rather than \u201cdemocracy,\u201d its simulacrum. The simulacrum, though, calls for their disavowal, in much the same way that Sybille Fischer argues that the modernity of the Haitian Revolution was disavowed.[34]<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            A pressing question for San\u00edn-Restrepo, then, is what is the role of the disavowed democrats in his conception of decolonization? The absence of any of, say, Guaman Poma, W.E.B. Du Bois, or Ella Baker from <em>Decolonizing Democracy <\/em>is not a problem in itself, but the general absence of the disavowed democrats raises issues about the text\u2019s orientation toward, very loosely speaking, postmodern or anti-modern European thought. Is the implicit argument that the disavowed democrats of the past were, simply, lacking in their articulation of the ideal of democracy because they failed to make the postmodern moves characteristic of Agamben, Negri, Deleuze, et al? If that is the case, then San\u00edn-Restrepo offers a theoretical advancement over both the Euro-postmodern critiques and the tradition of disavowed democrats by fusing elements of the two camps together. If not, it would seem that San\u00edn-Restrepo is part of a lineage, a democratic critic of the postmoderns who, in showing how their theoretical positions are insufficient for the achievement of decolonization and<em> <\/em>democracy, is a fellow to the disavowed democrats. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            The exclusion of moderns and disavowal of democrats at issue here is a part and parcel of coloniality\u2019s production of \u201cthe hidden people,\u201d to use San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s term. What is hidden, then, is not merely the people themselves but the <em>thinking and ideas <\/em>of those people.[35] This suggests that the over-representation of \u201cphilosophy\u201d as if it were philosophy itself involves not only forms of Euromodern narcissism but dynamics involving the active exclusion of actual philosophical thought from the general understanding of what counts as philosophical\u2014and, it would seem, these dynamics are equally present regardless of which side of the Analytic\/Continental divide is under examination. Coloniality involves the production, in short, of hidden philosophies and hidden philosophers.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            This raises questions in light of San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s closing observation, in <em>Decolonizing Democracy<\/em>, on political philosophy. He argues that the tendency in Hardt and Negri\u2014and, one might conclude, typical exponents of contemporary Continental thought at large\u2014is to render sovereignty intrinsically problematic and to seek means of seizing people power beyond the sovereign. Attention to the ways in which Euromodern sovereignty is premised on the exclusion of the hidden people, though, shows that such directions may rest upon fallacy. Hence, San\u00edn-Restrepo concludes:<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p style=\"margin-left:40px;white-space:pre-wrap;\" class=\"\">The primordial effort of political philosophy must then be directed to synthesize sovereignty and people as true democracy\u2026 <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            The only history that should matter to a real political philosophy in the twenty-first century has to be precisely those legal and political schemes from where the absolute and irreconcilable detachment between the people and democracy was planned and executed. Political philosophy must encounter head on the way the people have been replaced\u2014first by a dense image of a people as an impossible totality that depends on a fundamental exclusion, and then by the production of institutions deriving their hidden legitimacy from this image. Ultimately the first question has to concern how democracy can function without a people or a substitute that is only nominal and empty. To continue to omit sovereignty is to help the executioner blindfold his victims. (207)<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            In short, political philosophy is tasked with bringing about a world in which sovereignty is fused with the people as such\u2014and, hence, political philosophy is tasked with bringing about a sovereignty fully inclusive of the power of the hidden people.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; If it is the case that political philosophy has this as its task\u2014to overcome \u201cdemocracy\u201d in favor of democracy by restoring and\/or inaugurating the power of the hidden people\u2014then this should raise the question of political philosophy\u2019s responsibilities to the hidden philosophers and hidden philosophies. In short, does political philosophy bear a responsibility for synthesizing <em>itself <\/em>with the hidden people and to bring a measure of philosophical sovereignty to the people? I submit that it does. If this is the case, it suggests that part of the \u201chistory that should matter to a real political philosophy\u201d is the execution of the plan by which the hidden philosophers and philosophies have been concealed. But this history would only be rendered relevant to the extent that that which had been disavowed as philosophy and those that had been disavowed as philosophers are actively engaged. Of course, an argument such as this is incoherent if pitched at philosophy or philosophers as a whole, because it presupposes that, <em>for the hidden philosophers<\/em>, an attitude of excluding other hidden philosophers prevails; this is clearly not the case.[36] Rather, the argument would imply that those heretofore working within the framework of \u201cphilosophy\u201d (as a simulacrum of philosophy) would be obligated to turn their attention to hidden philosophy.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; An impediment to such a turn would be the phenomenon that Lewis Gordon has identified as \u201cdisciplinary decadence.\u201d[37] Disciplinary decadence involves forms of epistemic closure in which one cannot access realities lying beyond the reach of one\u2019s own discipline(s). Where \u201cphilosophy\u201d is concerned, there is a tendency to treat Analytic and Continental approaches as if they were two separate disciplines and to train aspiring philosophers accordingly. A consequence of this that is familiar to academically-trained professional philosophers is the tendency of Analytic philosophers to fail to grasp the contributions of Continental philosophers and vice versa. A separate consequence, though, is that the Eurocentrism definitive of both the Analytic and the Continental leads academic philosophers to tend defend their lack of familiarity with Africana and Latin American thought on the grounds of its lying on the other side of the Analytic\/Continental divide. For many Analytic philosophers, Africana thought is viewed as a subfield of Continental Philosophy and, hence, beyond the purview of what they could be expected to read and engage. The Continental view of Africana thought is perhaps less limited, but not without its insidious dimensions. There, Africana philosophy is accepted as a disciplinary bedfellow generally only to the extent that it engages with prominent figures in the Continental canon\u2014a figure such as Fanon is welcome to the extent that he is regarded as building upon the work of Hegel, Marx, Freud, or Sartre or, perhaps, as prefiguring the concerns of a Derrida or Foucault. Hence, figures such as Ta\u0301i\u0301wo\u0300, for whom dealing with questions of decolonization does not mandate an engagement with 20th century Continental thought, are beyond the scope of what many Continental thinkers are willing to entertain.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Disciplinarily decadent approaches in the Analytic field have been, since Rawls, preoccupied with offering a conceptual analysis of \u201cjustice,\u201d or, on occasion, on other terms with a genealogical grounding in the European\/Western philosophical heritage\u2014liberty, democracy, nondomination, etc. Such approaches are indifferent or impervious to commonplace hermeneuticist, postmodern, and\/or poststructuralist challenges, for which an ideally rational account of political values is regarded as impossible and, typically, undesirable. The Analytic turn toward the non-ideal offers, to some, an escape from these challenges, insofar as it implies that one may abandon the pursuit of grand ideals in favor of a more direct attention to reality. Yet, non-ideal theory at best would entail <em>delaying<\/em> the project of reckoning with those issues, rather than sidestepping them altogether. Analytic political philosophy may manifest a decadent commitment to Rawlsian ideal theory, in which the task of the philosopher is imagined as consisting in nothing more than a conceptual analysis of \u201cjustice\u201d or related terms as they would be manifest in idealized contexts. To acknowledge this, though, is not to negate the possibility or likelihood of the reverse: that the call for non-ideal theory yields forms of disciplinary decadence in which, having reduced the field of political philosophy to examination of what to do under irreparable conditions, it crowds out efforts to think radically about those values and institutions that really are desirable. Indeed, for many political philosophers it has become taboo for one\u2019s work to be understood as \u201cteleological\u201d or concerned with \u201cprogress.\u201d Yet such appeals mask that they are, indeed, <em>teleological commitments<\/em> to do away with teleology and progress. The dimensions of coloniality present in Euromodern accounts of teloi and progress are taken as na\u00efve warrants for wholesale rejection rather than as stimuli to more rigorous thinking about which teloi and which modes of achieving progress toward those teloi are desirable and justifiable.[38] Disciplinarily decadent approaches to ideal theory and non-ideal theory serve to impoverish each by foreclosing the rigor that emerges where theorists hold themselves responsible for understanding the relationship between non-ideal conditions and conditions that are genuinely desirable.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">           Of course, there is a further issue of the possible decadence of Analytic political philosophy even should it successfully overcome the deleterious effects of an ideal\/non-ideal schism. In short, any philosophical approach grounded in the analysis of extant Euromodern values and ideals\u2014and\/or analysis of what actions or additional values that axiological commitment on those grounds would entail\u2014remains subject to the charge that those values need to be decrypted to demonstrate their colonial function. At best, this would imply the role for Analytic political philosophy as taking primarily the form of conceptual decolonization, as has been suggested by thinkers like Kwasi Wiredu, in which cross-cultural dialogue about the meanings of terms such as \u201cdemocracy\u201d can be used to overcome the Eurocentric presuppositions present in articulations thereof.[39] At worst, this would suggest that the effort to render Euromodern values as <em>apparently <\/em>non-colonial, post-colonial, or decolonized, may involve simply an effort to enhance the function of colonial simulacra: it would exacerbate, rather than eliminate, the function of Euromodern ideals to produce an undesirable world on the one hand and to affect the taken-for-granted quality of that world\u2019s desirability on the other hand. One could conclude, then, that the projects of decryption for which San\u00edn-Restrepo calls are a necessary antidote to the tendency toward disciplinary decadence present in Analytic thought, insofar as it is premised on the clarification of the meaning of extant concepts rather than the effort to understand the ideological and\/or colonial functions that those concepts may serve.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Yet by the same token, disciplinarily decadent approaches in Continental thought bear much the same problem when employed as a rationale for indifference to conceptual and rational examination of ideals. Simply put, one must confront the question of whether post-colonial, non-colonial, decolonized, decolonial, or anti-colonial ideals are possible. The hasty generalization drawn by many philosophers informed by postmodern and poststructuralist accounts is that rationality and, indeed, even values themselves may be little more than residue of projects of colonizing the world and colonizing an otherwise wild psyche. Hence, the task of the philosopher becomes merely to demonstrate the failures and aporias of political thinking and institutions, rather than the difficult project of constructing alternatives. The obvious issue to raise here is that the logic of such accounts would imply their contiguity with the Euromodern legacies they criticize. One may conclude from this that, insofar as postmodern or poststructuralist-infused accounts that are taken as reasons to reject the decolonial thinking of excluded moderns, hidden philosophers, and disavowed democrats, they are precisely a recapitulation of the colonial dynamics they regard themselves as transcending. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\"><\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">           Overcoming the tendency toward decadence in Continental political philosophy may entail, then, fusing the project of articulating non-, post-, anti-, and\/or de-colonial ideals with the effort to take seriously the hidden philosophy that the broader Euromodern tradition of which Continental thought is a part has functioned to conceal. Crucially, this may be a different matter than trying to bring about the decolonization of Euromodern ideals. Note, for instance, that for someone like Ta\u0301i\u0301wo\u0300, Euromodern <em>articulations <\/em>of ideals can be decoupled from the notion of modernity, such that one may speak of modernity as a desirable ideal that bears no essential relation to Europe or coloniality. It is true that one could approach that matter by, as it were, peeling the skin of Euromodern coloniality away from the flesh of the ideals Euromodern thinkers had articulated. Then again, though, one may simply take up the project of offering a coherent account of what it means to be modern and flesh out this account through the study of other modernities\u2014that is, African, Asian, Amerindian, etc. modernities. Hence, it is not clear that what is at issue&nbsp;is a conceptual decolonization of European discourses on modernity so much as it is, simply, an effort to conceptually analyze modernity and modern ideals in light of thinking and practices grounded in the global south. Hence, the project of articulating desirable ideals of modernity would not amount to merely the decryption of Euromodern thought in order to separate the wheat from the colonial chaff.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            We have here an important distinction. It is one thing to offer an analysis of extant ideals in light of an effort to decolonize their prior articulations. It is quite another thing to synthesize meaningful ideals that are commensurable with and\/or desirable for anti-colonial and decolonial struggles, or that would be meaningful for genuinely post-colonial societies and institutions. The synthesis of concepts, though, involves a project of elucidating their limits and limitations: novel terms call for conceptual analysis as much as do familiar ones, and, we may say, decolonial values call for conceptual analysis as much as do Euromodern ones. Where the practice of philosophy within the narrow framework of the Continental veers toward decadence, then, is where the approach mandates a refusal to work conceptually with ideals in favor of forms of hermeneutic and\/or poststructuralist skepticism or pessimism about the possibility of axiological intelligibility. To slightly modify San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s formulation, we may contend that the task of political philosophy includes the project of uniting the hidden people with <em>axiological <\/em>sovereignty, which calls, in turn, for modes of rational examination that decadent approaches in Continental thought may forswear.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A consequence of this, then, should be as follows: San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s call for decryption is necessary but insufficient for the project of a decolonizing political philosophy. Decryption involves both a critical theoretical perspective on how discourses manifest their colonial function as well as a deconstructive impulse toward demonstrating other alternatives. Therefore, decryption opens up possibility for imagining otherwise; it is epistemically counter-hegemonic, and thus may serve as a precursor to synthesizing ideals. However, a limitation of the decryptive project is that it may require presupposing the presence of pre-encrypted meanings. For a decryption of \u201cdemocracy,\u201d this concern may appear trivial, insofar as serious attention to the term\u2019s meaning points to the issue of the rule of the people prior to the production of a hidden people\u2014in other words, here we do have the presence of a pre-encrypted meaning, even if the \u201cpre\u201d in that formulation need not imply a strictly historico-temporal sense. Yet where it comes to the understanding of ideals from beyond the Euromodern axiological canon, it is not obvious that encryption serves any essential function. If there are <em>anti-colonial <\/em>ideals\u2014meaning not ideals that are pre-colonial or non-colonial but, rather, ideals that are meaningful to anti-colonial political struggle\u2014then the apprehension of their meanings and desirability would call not for critical hermeneutic practices of decryption but rather for imaginative efforts that may call, ultimately, for forms of intersubjective dialogue and debate.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Colonialism and coloniality have involved the disavowal of the hidden people as people, meaning, on the one hand, that Euromodern political \u201cphilosophy\u201d has tended to resolve normative questions on the basis of the presupposed irrelevance or repudiation of non-European humanity and, on the other hand, that non-European political philosophy is treated as if it were not philosophy. If colonized peoples and their successors are to achieve degrees of axiological sovereignty\u2014if they are able to articulate and debate their political beliefs in shared contexts with real public stakes\u2014then this would seem to imply an overcoming of such disavowal. However, \u201covercoming\u201d in this context would not necessarily amount to \u201celimination,\u201d because the axiological sovereignty of the colonized need not be a matter of colonizers and other hegemonic communities recognizing and\/or consenting to their ideas.[40] In other words, overcoming coloniality may be less a matter of colonial beneficiaries consenting to regard the struggles and thought of anti-colonial communities as legitimate and more a matter of lessening the power of colonizers to the point of their irrelevance. If decryption is a powerful antidote to the disavowal of the hidden people, its limitation lies in its having less to offer when the hidden people seek to avow, refine, and realize values of their own.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; What this suggests is that for anti-colonial political philosophy, the project of decryption is one that goes hand-in-hand with the project of articulating other ideals. To posit coloniality as the ideally non-ideal is to take responsibility both for how one conceives of what is ideal as well as for how one conceives of the reality that fails to fulfill that ideal. Because competing ideals compose part of that reality, such a theoretical endeavor calls, ultimately, for an ability to understand various ideals in relation to each other. What is non-ideal from the theorist\u2019s perspective may, as San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s work shows us, be precisely the fulfillment of another ideal. To give a theoretical account of politics calls for understanding the relationship between the real and the desirable upon a terrain in which the real is a reflection of competing desires. To decrypt the non-ideal is to demonstrate the hidden functioning of its oft-concealed ideal(s). To posit the ideal as genuinely ideal calls, in turn, for doing so rigorously in light of what one has learned about the functioning of undesired or undesirable ideals.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\"><\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">            Let us conclude by returning directly to the issue raised by Rawls and Hegel of the salience of the society\u2019s implicit rationality to political philosophy. Much of non-ideal theory, it could be said, starts with a rejection of this framework: because the society is irrational, as it does not manifest the commitment to justice that reason would demand, the theorist turns simply to the effort of understanding how to survive and navigate its injustices. Likewise for much of Continental political philosophy that takes on the challenges to rationality that characterized much of its 20th century development: because a rational society is regarded as impossible or undesirable, the task of the theorist is not to glean an underlying rationality but to offer an ironic or playful counterpoint. Although there is much that could be said to be anti-colonial or decolonial political philosophy that fits into one or the other of these frameworks, I contend that there is a different and very much worthwhile strand afoot. There, understanding precisely what makes coloniality rational\u2014and understanding how the rationality of coloniality stands in relation to the rationality or rationalities of colonialism\u2014serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it simply allows the theorist to be better attuned to reality: the theorist is not, as is the case for many Rawlsian political philosophers, concerned only with the contours of an imagined social world. On the other hand, it means that the theorist stands in confrontation with a rationality <em>that it would be desirable to overcome<\/em>, which raises the question of <em>what other rationalities are possible<\/em>. In short, the Hegelian project of political philosophy need not take the form of a <em>rationalization <\/em>of society as it stands, in which <em>what is<\/em> always implicitly demonstrates <em>what should be<\/em>. Apprehending the rationality of a colonial society\u2014or of a globe overtaken by the agglomeration of overtly and covertly colonial forces\u2014is a precursor to putting forth rigorous accounts of how a society or a globe really ought to be and of those ideals that would make its functioning not only rational but desirable.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\"><\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[1] John Rawls, <em>Justice as Fairness: A Restatement<\/em>, edited by Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2001). p. 4. For Hegel\u2019s classic formulation, see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, <em>Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right<\/em>, translated by H.B. Nisbet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[2] Although many prefer to refer to this tradition simply as \u201canalytic philosophy,\u201d in this paper I will refer to it as \u201cAnalytic philosophy.\u201d This is because our relevant context will be a consideration of mainstream tendencies on each side of the so-called Analytic\/Continental divide. To suggest that neither Continental philosophy nor any other philosophical tradition beyond the Anglo-American is \u201canalytic\u201d in its orientation is philosophically problematic, unless one loads up the notion of analyticity with so much definitional baggage that it would be difficult even to find many Anglo-American practitioners thereof. Hence, I will treat \u201cAnalytic\u201d and \u201cContinental\u201d as names\u2014and, hence, as proper nouns\u2014whose extensional referents are both philosophically and sociologically problematic, even as these terms are, if perhaps regrettably, nonetheless rather useful in referring to phenomena in the sociology of knowledge at the level of generality and typicality.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[3] John Rawls, <em>A Theory of Justice<\/em>, Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999), p. 216.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[4] Charles Mills, \u201c\u2018Ideal Theory\u2019 as Ideology,\u201d <em>Hypatia <\/em>volume 20, number 3, Summer 2005, pp. 165-184. For an argument that, <em>contra <\/em>Mills, the preference for \u201cnonideal methodology\u201d is no less ideological than the preference for ideal theory, see Matthew Adams, \u201cAn Ideology Critique of Nonideal Methodology,\u201d <em>European Journal of Critical Theory<\/em>, forthcoming.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[5] Though Rawls\u2019s original usage referred to \u201cnonideal theory,\u201d contemporary usage often employs the hyphenated \u201cnon-ideal\u201d as well. Though some philosophers may implicitly or explicitly be utilizing a distinction between \u201cnonideal\u201d and \u201cnon-ideal,\u201d in this paper I will use the terms interchangeably. For a critical survey of recent approaches in non-ideal theory, see Laura Valentini, \u201cIdeal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,\u201d <em>Philosophy Compass <\/em>7\/9 (2012), pp. 654-664.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[6] I have in mind here works such as David Brion Davis, <em>The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823<\/em>, revised edition with new preface (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Works such as these explore the political thought of influential political agents in light of the contradictions their ideas would seem to imply\u2014in Davis\u2019s case, the contradiction between the revolutionary discourse of centralized colonial administration as a form of \u201cslavery\u201d and the revolutionaries\u2019 various modes of support for and\/or dependence on chattel slavery. However, I read that as a very different project than the Hegelian one alluded to by Rawls. The former involves demonstrating the <em>lack <\/em>of a rigorous, coherent, and supervenient logic that bedevils much of Euromodern political thought and discourse (particularly as it regards the consistency of its recognition of the humanity of non-European peoples). The latter, though, would be an effort to analyze the political <em>reality<\/em> of such contexts as composing a coherent, rational whole. Indeed, the coherence of the political reality may, in some cases, <em>require<\/em> there to be contradictions in political discourse, such that the Hegelian project would seek to unearth how discursive contradictions beget the rational functioning of political institutions.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[7] Ricardo San\u00edn-Restrepo, <em>Decolonizing Democracy: Power in a Solid State<\/em> (New York: Rowman &amp; Littlefield International, 2016). <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[8] For the notion of \u201cmodernity\u2019s underside,\u201d see Enrique Dussel, <em>The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor &amp; the Philosophy of Liberation<\/em>, translated and edited by Eduardo Mendieta (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1998). On the notion of coloniality, see, <em>intra alia<\/em>, An\u00edbal Quijano, \u201cColoniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,\u201d <em>Nepantla: Views from South<\/em> 1:3 (2000), pp. 533-580; and <em>Globalization and the Decolonial Option<\/em>, edited by Walter D. Mignolo and Arturo Escobar (New York: Routledge, 2010), most of which was originally published as Volume 21, Numbers 2 &amp; 3 of <em>Cultural Studies<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[9] \u201cSimulacrum\u201d is one of the most important terms for San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s account. The key reference for San\u00edn-Restrepo here is Gilles Deleuze, <em>Difference and Repetition<\/em> (London: Bloomsbury, 2004). Though he does not invoke Jean Baudrillard explicitly, the influence of Baudrillard\u2019s formulation of that concept is felt in San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s text. See Jean Baudrillard, <em>Simulacra and Simulation<\/em>, translated by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[10] On the notion of problem people, see also Lewis R. Gordon, \u201cDu Bois\u2019s Humanistic Philosophy of Human Sciences,\u201d <em>Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science<\/em> 568 (March 2000), pp. 265\u2013280.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[11] For a compelling critique of the notion of persons or acts being \u201cnon-racist,\u201d see Michael J. Monahan, <em>The Creolizing Subject: Race, Reason, and the Politics of Purity<\/em> (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), chapter 5.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[12] Gabriel M\u00e9ndez-Hincapie and Ricardo San\u00edn-Restrepo, \u201cLa Constituci\u00f3n Encriptada. Nuevas formas de emacipaci\u00f3n del poder global,\u201d <em>Redhes, Revista de Derechos Humanos y Estudios Sociales<\/em>, N\u00famero 8 (2012), Universidad Aut\u00f3noma de San Luis de Potos\u00ed; <em>Decrypting Power<\/em>, edited by Ricardo San\u00edn-Restrepo (New York: Rowman &amp; Littlefield International, 2018). <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[13] Ricardo San\u00edn-Restrepo, \u201cIntroduction,\u201d <em>Decrypting Power<\/em>, p. xxi.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[14] I say that this may strike many readers as unlikely because, as is discussed in the next section, the text primarily addresses philosophers and critical theorists working in the Continental tradition. It is somewhat typical for many working in the Analytic tradition to regard monographs devoted to such interventions as beyond the scope of political philosophy, or at least political philosophy with which their work could possibly engage. This is, likewise, a formula applied with the same degree of typicality on the other side of the purported Analytic\/Continental divide. An alternative reason could be given, in addition, to support this claim: that it simply remains rare for political philosophers identifying as Analytic or as Continental to engage literature on coloniality.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[15] See also Rogers Smith, <em>Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History<\/em> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), which examines the same issue in terms of the dominant approaches to studying the United States in political science. Smith\u2019s text is a crucial point of discussion in Mills\u2019s \u201cIdeal Theory as Ideology.\u201d<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[16] Matthew Adams\u2019s recent critique of Mills makes a similar point pitched in terms of Mills\u2019s call for non-ideal theory fulfilling an ideological function for neoliberal capitalism. See Adams, \u201cAn Ideology Critique of Nonideal Methodology.\u201d It is worth noting here, though, that viewed in light of theoretical frameworks in decolonial studies, one may reasonably contend that Adams\u2019s <em>particular <\/em>ideological critique of nonideal methodology can be seen as ideologically derivative of coloniality\u2014though such a finding would not undermine the conclusion that the preference for non-ideal theory over ideal theory is ideological, because the salient features of capital for Adams\u2019s account would remain salient features of any account of coloniality grounded in Quijano\u2019s articulation thereof.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[17] Indeed, one may look to the earlier formulation of \u201cAmericanity\u201d as an attempt to distinguish the periodized historical account of what emerges through European conquest from \u201ccoloniality\u201d as something that Americanity inaugurates. See An\u00edbal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein, \u201cAmericanity as a Concept, or the Americas in the Modern World-System,\u201d <em>International Social Science Journal<\/em> 44:4 (1992), p. 549-557. There, coloniality is articulated as one of four \u201cnewnesses\u201d that Americanity would initiate: \u201ccoloniality, ethnicity, racism, and the concept of newness itself\u201d (550). Although the <em>historical <\/em>point of the novelty of these four factors in the production of the modern world-system is given a strong account there, one may nonetheless come to the conclusions that, as there conceptualized, coloniality, ethnicity, racism, and newness refer to phenomena that <em>could <\/em>have emerged under different circumstances\u2014indeed, that could have had, and perhaps did in fact have, manifestations in earlier historical contexts\u2014and that could, in principle, recur in future world-systems after the present one subsides.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[18] I do not mean to imply that, as historical and political phenomena, this means that one should presume a radical distinction between coloniality and colonialism such that one can erect a dichotomous barrier between that which evidences coloniality and that which evidences colonialism. As historical phenomena, colonialism begat coloniality\u2014indeed, various forms and iterations of colonialism begat various forms and iterations of coloniality. But understanding the genetic relationship between the two should not cloud an understanding of the functional dimensions of the two that imply a cleavage at the level of values and ideals.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[19] This, of course, presupposes that one regards colonized people as people, rather than treating them as hidden people; typical members of Euromodernity\u2019s overside\u2014including many political philosophers\u2014may, of course, regard colonialism and coloniality as manifestations of justice rather than injustice because of their commitments to viewing the humanity of Euormodernity\u2019s underside as non-existent or heavily impaired. <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[20] Frantz Fanon, <em>The Wretched of the Earth<\/em>, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963).<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[21] See Walter D. Mignolo and Catherine E. Walsh, <em>On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis<\/em> (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018).<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[22] Reva Siegel, \u201cWhy Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action,\u201d <em>Stanford Law Review<\/em> 49:5 (May 1997), pp. 1111-1148.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[23] See Thomas Hobbes, <em>Leviathan<\/em>, Penguin Classics Edition (New York: Penguin Books, 1985); and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, <em>The Social Contract<\/em>, translated by Maurice Cranston (New York: Penguin Books, 1968).<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[24] See, e.g., Michel Foucault, <em>History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction<\/em>, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); Jacques Derrida, <em>Of Grammatology<\/em>, Fortieth Anniversary Edition translated by Gayatri Spivak and with an introduction by Judith Butler (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016); Paul Ricoeur, <em>From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II<\/em>, translated by Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson and with a foreword by Richard Kearney (New York: Continuum, 2008).<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[25] Precisely what those origins are and what the scope of the referent of \u201cContinental\u201d is are, of course, matters of ongoing and long-standing debate. For an overview, see William R. Schroeder, <em>Continental Philosophy: A Critical Approach<\/em> (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005). <\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[26] Sylvia Wynter, \u201cUnsettling the Coloniality of Being\/Power\/Truth\/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation\u2014An Argument,\u201d <em>CR: The New Centennial Review<\/em> 3.3 (2003), pp. 257-337.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[27] For accounts of Euromodern philosophy and political thought in terms of these dynamics, see, for instance: Genevieve Lloyd, <em>The Man of Reason: \u2018Male\u2019 and \u2018Female\u2019 in Western Philosophy<\/em>, second edition (London: Routledge, 1993); Peter K.J. Park, <em>Africa, Asia, and the History of Philosophy: Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical Canon, 1780-1830<\/em> (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2013); Leonard Harris, \u201c\u2018Believe it Or Not\u2019 or the Ku Klux Klan and American Philosophy Exposed,\u201d <em>Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association<\/em> 68:5 (May, 1995), pp. 133-137; Penny A. Weiss, <em>Canon Fodder: Historical Women Political Thinkers<\/em> (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2009).<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[28] See Charles W. Mills, \u201cContract of Breach: Repairing the Racial Contract,\u201d in Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills, <em>Contract &amp; Domination<\/em> (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007), pp. 106-133.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[29] See, e.g., Nelson Maldonado-Torres, \u201cToward a Critique of Continental Reason: Africana Studies and the Decolonization of Imperial Cartographies in the Americas,\u201d in <em>Not Only the Master\u2019s Tools: African-American Studies in Theory and Practice<\/em>, edited by Lewis R. Gordon and Jane Anna Gordon (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 51-84.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[30] For an argument in this vein regarding \u201cjustice,\u201d see Lewis Gordon, \u201cWhen Justice Is Not Enough: Toward the Decolonization of Normative Life,\u201d in <em>Geopolitics and Decolonization: Perspectives from the Global South<\/em>, edited by Fernanda Frizzo Bragato and Lewis R. Gordon (New York: Rowman &amp; Littlefield International, 2018), pp. 31-48.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[31] See Olu\u0301fe\u0301\u0323mi Ta\u0301i\u0301wo\u0300, <em>How Colonialism Preempted Modernity in Africa<\/em>, Indiana University Press, 2010; <em>Africa Must Be Modern<\/em>, Indiana University Press, 2014; \u201c\u2018The love of freedom brought us here\u2019: An Introduction to Modern African Political Philosophy,\u201d <em>South Atlantic Quarterly<\/em> 109:2, Spring 2010, pp. 391-410.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[32] Walter D. Mignolo, <em>The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options<\/em> (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), p. 66; Lewis R. Gordon, <em>What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought<\/em> (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), p. 87. I use the formulation of Euromodernity throughout this piece because of a nuance that Ta\u0301i\u0301wo\u0300\u2019s rejection of that formulation may miss: as Gordon uses it, Euromodernity denotes a conception of modernity in which modernity is conceived of as an exclusively European ideal or achievement. Hence, there could be other forms of modernity\u2014even ones realized by Europeans\u2014that would not count as Euromodern.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[33] Olu\u0301fe\u0301\u0323mi Ta\u0301i\u0301wo\u0300, \u201cExcluded Moderns and Race\/Racism in Euro-American Philosophy: James Africanus Beale Horton,\u201d <em>The CLR James Journal<\/em> 24:1\/2 (Fall 2018), pp. 177-203.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[34] Sybille Fischer, <em>Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution<\/em>, Duke University Press, 2004.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[35] For a reflection on this issue, see Lewis R. Gordon, <em>Existentia Africana: Understanding Africana Existential Thought<\/em> (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 22-40.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[36] That is not to say, though, that there are no hidden philosophers who participate in the exclusion of other hidden philosophers. It is simply to say that this is not always the case and, indeed, often is not the case.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[37] Lewis R. Gordon, <em>Disciplinary Decadence: Living Thought in Trying Times<\/em> (New York: Routledge, 2016).<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[38] For discussion, see Drucilla Cornell, <em>Defending Ideals: War, Democracy, and Political Struggles<\/em> (New York: Routledge), especially pp. 85-98.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[39] See Kwasi Wiredu, <em>Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective <\/em>(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), especially pp. 136-144.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">[40] For discussion, see Glen Sean Coulthard, <em>Red Skin White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition<\/em> (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\"><\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\"><strong>Bio:<\/strong> Thomas Meagher is Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Memphis. He works in the areas of social and political philosophy, Africana philosophy, phenomenology, and existentialism, with particular interest in questions pertaining to race, gender, and coloniality and their capacity to shape and re-shape human values. He earned his doctorate at the University of Connecticut where he completed his dissertation, \u201cMaturity in a Human World: A Philosophical Study.\u201d He has also served as a Visiting Assistant Professor at Quinnipiac University and as a Du Bois Visiting Scholar at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst.<\/p>\n<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p class=\"\" style=\"white-space:pre-wrap;\">This paper examines methodological problems in political philosophy by way of an examination of the phenomenon of coloniality, animated by an analysis of Ricardo San\u00edn-Restrepo\u2019s Decolonizing Democracy: Power in a Solid State.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":8678545,"featured_media":9027,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":true,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_wpcom_ai_launchpad_first_post":false,"_jetpack_hide_featured_image":false,"_jetpack_featured_image_duplicate_dismissed":0,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[48,61,75],"tags":[74],"class_list":["post-9026","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog","category-gcas-review","category-peer-reviewed","tag-peer-reviewed"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v28.9 (Yoast SEO v28.9) - 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